Charlie Munger on trials

The Economist

@TheEconomist

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13m

For Charlie Munger, curiosity was a lifelong project, and he believed that business people should constantly refresh their knowledge, by challenging their assumptions and learning from mistakes more than successes https://econ.st/46xSX6R

George Mack

@george__mack

My favorite Charlie Munger story: In 1953, Munger was 29 years old. Recently divorced. Lost the house. Huge social stigma of divorce back then. His 8-year-old son, Teddy, was diagnosed with cancer. The leukemia was incurable. No medical insurance - Munger paid for all his medical care. Charlie would visit Teddy in the hospital every day -- and then walk the streets crying. Teddy died at the age of 9. Charlie was broke, divorced and just lost his child. 99.9% of people would've turned to alcohol, drugs, or suicide. (And you'd understand why) Munger never did. Fast forward to 52 years old, a failed surgery left him blind in one eye with the potential of going fully blind one day. Charlie was an obsessive learner who read every book he could get his hands on. When confronted with the possibility of going blind and no longer being able to read he said: "It's time for me to learn braille!" The only thing that might be more impressive than his intellect was his actions. RIP. --------- Munger on Self-Pity: "Generally speaking, envy, resentment, revenge, and self-pity are disastrous modes of thought. Self-pity gets pretty close to paranoia… Every time you find your drifting into self-pity, I don’t care what the cause, your child could be dying from cancer, self-pity is not going to improve the situation. It’s a ridiculous way to behave. Life will have terrible blows, horrible blows, unfair blows, it doesn’t matter. Some people recover and others don’t. There I think the attitude of Epictetus is the best. He thought that every mischance in life was an opportunity to behave well. Every mischance in life was an opportunity to learn something and that your duty was not to be immersed in self-pity, but to utilize the terrible blow in a constructive fashion. That is a very good idea."

Charlie Munger's Psychology of Human Misjudgment

Alex & Books 

@AlexAndBooks_

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Or if you want a free resource to learn more about Munger, here's an excellently summarized and animated video of his famous "The Psychology of Human Misjudgment" speech:

https://x.com/AlexAndBooks_/status/1729625308276404619?s=20

https://www.sloww.co/psychology-human-misjudgment-charlie-munger/

This post is a summary of all 25 psychological tendencies from the revised and updated version of The Psychology of Human Misjudgment that’s included in the book. Charlie Munger says:

• “The tendencies are probably much more good than bad. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be there, working pretty well for man, given his condition and his limited brain capacity. So the tendencies can’t be simply washed out automatically, and shouldn’t be. Nevertheless, the psychological thought system described, when properly understood and used, enables the spread of wisdom and good conduct and facilitates the avoidance of disaster. Tendency is not always destiny, and knowing the tendencies and their antidotes can often help prevent trouble that would otherwise occur.”

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Quick Housekeeping:

• All quotes in quotation marks are from the original author unless otherwise stated.
• I’ve added emphasis in bold for readability/skimmability.

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Summary Contents: Click a link here to jump to a section below

1. Reward and Punishment Superresponse Tendency
2. Liking/Loving Tendency
3. Disliking/Hating Tendency
4. Doubt-Avoidance Tendency
5. Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency
6. Curiosity Tendency
7. Kantian Fairness Tendency
8. Envy/Jealousy Tendency
9. Reciprocation Tendency
10. Influence-from-Mere-Association Tendency
11. Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial
12. Excessive Self-Regard Tendency
13. Overoptimism Tendency
14. Deprival-Superreaction Tendency
15. Social-Proof Tendency
16. Contrast-Misreaction Tendency
17. Stress-Influence Tendency
18. Availability-Misweighing Tendency
19. Use-It-or-Lose-It Tendency
20. Drug-Misinfluence Tendency
21. Senescence-Misinfluence Tendency
22. Authority-Misinfluence Tendency
23. Twaddle Tendency
24. Reason-Respecting Tendency
25. Lollapalooza Tendency

censorship complex

Michael Shellenberger

@shellenberger

“Volunteer” and “Former” Government Agents

Bloomberg, Washington Post and others published credulous stories in the spring of 2020 claiming that the CTI League was simply a group of volunteer cybersecurity experts. Its founders were: a “former” Israeli intelligence official, Ohad Zaidenberg; a Microsoft “security manager,” Nate Warfield; and the head of sec ops for DEF CON, a hackers convention, Marc Rogers. The articles claimed that those highly skilled cybercrime professionals had decided to help billion-dollar hospitals, on their own time and without pay, for strictly altruistic motives. In just one month, from mid-March to mid-April, the supposedly all-volunteer CTIL had grown to “1,400 vetted members in 76 countries spanning 45 different sectors,” had “helped to lawfully take down 2,833 cybercriminal assets on the internet, including 17 designed to impersonate government organizations, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization,” and had “identified more than 2,000 vulnerabilities in healthcare institutions in more than 80 countries.” At every opportunity the men stressed that they were simply volunteers motivated by altruism. “I knew I had to do something to help,” said Zaidenberg. ”There is a really strong appetite for doing good in the community,” Rogers said during an Aspen Institute webinar. And yet a clear goal of CTIL’s leaders was to build support for censorship among national security and cybersecurity institutions. Toward that end, they sought to promote the idea of “cognitive security” as a rationale for government involvement in censorship activities. “Cognitive security is the thing you want to have,” said Terp on a 2019 podcast. “You want to protect that cognitive layer. It basically, it’s about pollution. Misinformation, disinformation, is a form of pollution across the Internet.” Terp and Pablo Breuer, another CTIL leader, like Zaidenberg, had backgrounds in the military and were former military contractors. Both have worked for SOFWERX, “a collaborative project of the U.S. Special Forces Command and Doolittle Institute.” The latter transfers Air Force technology, through the Air Force Resource Lab, to the private sector. According to Terp’s bio on the website of a consulting firm she created with Breuer, “She’s taught data science at Columbia University, was CTO of the UN’s big data team, designed machine learning algorithms and unmanned vehicle systems at the UK Ministry of Defence. Breuer is a former US Navy commander. According to his bio, he was “military director of US Special Operations Command Donovan Group and senior military advisor and innovation officer to SOFWERX, the National Security Agency, and U.S. Cyber Command as well as being the Director of C4 at U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.” Breuer is listed as having been in the Navy during the creation of CTIL on his LinkedIn page. In June, 2018, Terp attended a ten-day military exercise organized by the US Special Operations Command, where she says she first met Breuer and discussed modern disinformation campaigns on social media. Wired summed up the conclusions they drew from their meeting: “Misinformation, they realized, could be treated the same way: as a cybersecurity problem.” And so they created CogSec with David Perlman and another colleague, Thaddeus Grugq, at the lead. In 2019, Terp co-chaired the Misinfosec Working Group within CogSec. Breuer admitted in a podcast that his aim was to bring military tactics to use on social media platforms in the U.S. “I wear two hats,” he explained. “The military director of the Donovan Group, and one of two innovation officers at Sofwerx, which is a completely unclassified 501c3 nonprofit that's funded by U. S. Special Operations Command.”

Breuer went on to describe how they thought they were getting around the First Amendment. His work with Terp, he explained, was a way to get “nontraditional partners into one room,” including “maybe somebody from one of the social media companies, maybe a few special forces operators, and some folks from Department of Homeland Security… to talk in a non-attribution, open environment in an unclassified way so that we can collaborate better, more freely and really start to change the way that we address some of these issues.” The Misinfosec report advocated for sweeping government censorship and counter-misinformation. During the first six months of 2019, the authors say, they analyzed “incidents,” developed a reporting system, and shared their censorship vision with “numerous state, treaty and NGOs.” In every incident mentioned, the victims of misinformation were on the political Left, and they included Barack Obama, John Podesta, Hillary Clinton, and Emmanuel Macron. The report was open about the fact that its motivation for counter-misinformation were the twin political earthquakes of 2016: Brexit and the election of Trump. “A study of the antecedents to these events lead us to the realization that there’s something off kilter with our information landscape,” wrote Terp and her co-authors. “The usual useful idiots and fifth columnists—now augmented by automated bots, cyborgs and human trolls—are busily engineering public opinion, stoking up outrage, sowing doubt and chipping away at trust in our institutions. And now it’s our brains that are being hacked.” The Misinfosec report focused on information that “changes beliefs” through “narratives,” and recommended a way to counter misinformation by attacking specific links in a “kill chain” or influence chain from the misinfo “incident” before it becomes a full-blown narrative. The report laments that governments and corporate media no longer have full control of information. “For a long time, the ability to reach mass audiences belonged to the nation-state (e.g. in the USA via broadcast licensing through ABC, CBS and NBC). Now, however, control of informational instruments has been allowed to devolve to large technology companies who have been blissfully complacent and complicit in facilitating access to the public for information operators at a fraction of what it would have cost them by other means.” The authors advocated for police, military, and intelligence involvement in censorship, across Five Eyes nations, and even suggested that Interpol should be involved. The report proposed a plan for AMITT and for security, intelligence, and law enforcement collaboration and argued for immediate implementation. “We do not need, nor can we afford, to wait 27 years for the AMITT (Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques) framework to go into use.”

The authors called for placing censorship efforts inside of “cybersecurity” even while acknowledging that “misinformation security” is utterly different from cybersecurity. They wrote that the third pillar of “The information environment” after physical and cybersecurity should be “The Cognitive Dimension.” The report flagged the need for a kind of pre-bunking to “preemptively inoculate a vulnerable population against messaging.” The report also pointed to the opportunity to use the DHS-funded Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) as the homes for orchestrating public-private censorship, and argued that these ISACs should be used to promote confidence in government. It is here that we see the idea for the EIP and VP: “While social media is not identified as a critical sector, and therefore doesn’t qualify for an ISAC, a misinformation ISAC could and should feed indications and warnings into ISACs.” Terp’s view of “disinformation” was overtly political. “Most misinformation is actually true,” noted Terp in the 2019 podcast, “but set in the wrong context.” Terp is an eloquent explainer of the strategy of using “anti-disinformation” efforts to conduct influence operations. “You're not trying to get people to believe lies most of the time. Most of the time, you're trying to change their belief sets. And in fact, really, uh, deeper than that, you're trying to change, to shift their internal narratives… the set of stories that are your baseline for your culture. So that might be the baseline for your culture as an American.” In the fall, Terp and others sought to promote their report. The podcast Terp did with Breuer in 2019 was one example of this effort. Together Terp and Breuer described the “public-private” model of censorship laundering that DHS, EIP, and VP would go on to embrace. Breuer spoke freely, openly stating that the information and narrative control he had in mind was comparable to that implemented by the Chinese government, only made more palatable for Americans. “If you talk to the average Chinese citizen, they absolutely believe that the Great Firewall of China is not there for censorship. They believe that it's there because the Chinese Communist Party wants to protect the citizenry and they absolutely believe that's a good thing. If the US government tried to sell that narrative, we would absolutely lose our minds and say, ‘No, no, this is a violation of our First Amendment rights. So the in-group and out-group messaging have to be often different.”

8:35 AM · Nov 28, 2023

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Michael Shellenberger

@shellenberger

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The CTIL Files are a breakthrough because they allow us to see inside of the Censorship Industrial Complex from the perspective of the Deep State. We now have multiple sight lines: Twitter, Facebook, White House, DHS-CISA. The CTIL Files are also an indictment of the news media, which participated in CTIL’s disinformation efforts. Whistleblowers: my DMs on X are open. We will go to prison to protect our sources. Remember: YOU CANNOT TRUST THE MAINSTREAM NEWS MEDIA. THEY ARE PART OF THE CENSORSHIP AND DISINFORMATION COMPLEX. The CTIL Files reveal their strategy: - Denigrate, demonize, and de-humanize their targets - Demand censorship - Deny you’ve violated the First Amendment and interfered in elections